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THE RESEMBLANCE AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
CONTRACTS OF BAILMENT AND OF SALE OR EXCHANGE.

Sale or Eichange implies a transmutation of property from one
man to another, in consideration of some price or recompense in
value. 2 BI. Com. 446; see 88 P. S. R. 491.
Baffment, in its most general sense, and as used in our law, signifies the relation of one who delivers, to another who receives,
any movable thing, upon a trust expressed or implied. Bateman
on Commercial Law, § 608.
Some bailments and exchanges,-such, for instance, as bailments
of wool to be manufactured into cloth, of grain to be ground into
flour, and of grapes to be made into wine; and exchanges of wool
for cloth, of grain for flour, and of grapes for wine ;-present points
of resemblance which,-together with the peuliar phraseology, or
the vagueness and uncertainty of the evidence, of the agreement,frequently render it exceedingly difficult to accurately distinguish
between them. And as there is no work in which a full review of
the authorities on this subject has appeared, and as they have frequently been regarded as involving some little difficulty and confusion, it is supposed that the profession will excuse such a repreVOL.. XII. 21
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sentation of the principal cases in point as will show what the
rule or distinction they establish, really is.
Few of the old common law cases appear to have any bearing
upon the point. Menetone vs. Athawes, 8 Burr. 1592, and Colling
vs. Porbe8, 3 T. R. 816, though often referred to in this connection, shed not a ray of light upon the subject. If it was not in our
own country that the difficulty in question first assumed a practical
shape, it was at least in our own forums that it first met with the
consideration it deserves.
To our earlier cases, however, especially to Slaughtervs. Green,
1 Randolph's R. 3, and Seymour vs. Brown, 19 Johns. 44, may
justly be attributed most, if not all, of the confusion that now exists.
In the former, wheat was delivered to a miller to be ground, upon
an agreement that he should return a given quantity of flour for
so many bushels of wheat. The wheat being consumed by an 'accidental fire, the court held that the miller was not responsible for
the loss; that he stood in the relation of a, bailee and not a purchaser ; and that this construction of the contract would not be
affected by an understanding that the miller was not bound to return flour made from the identical wheat, "butflour of a certain
juantity made from any wheat in his mill. Judge RoAN, delivering
the opinion of the' court, says, " that where wheat is delivered at a
mill for the purpose of being converted into flour for the use of'
the bailor, the trahsaction does not lose its character of a bailment
because, for general convenience, there is an agreement, by coin-mon usage or otherwise, among the customers of a mill, that all the
wheat delivered should be put into a common stock, and return
made to each out of the common mass of flour. A condition of
this character, imposing no hardship on the bailee, and to which
there is an assent of all parties, cannot convert a bailment into a
sale or exchange of wheat for flour. The property in the wheat is
not conveyed to the millers, when they cannot sell the wheat in
specie without violating their contract, which is to grind it into
flour, nor even sell the flour itself without violating their agreement
to return it to the several bailors. This is a curious kind of ownership, in which the party has no absolute power over the subject
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either in its original state or after it has been manufactured. The
miller, in this case, has the absolute ownership of nothing, but the
excess of flour which may remain after returning the stipulated
quantity to the several farmers."
The Case of Seymour vs. Brown, 19 Johns. R. 44, was substantially this :-The plaintiff delivered wheat to the defendants, on an
agreement, that for every five bushels of wheat the plaintiff should
deliver at the defendants' mill, the defendants would deliver
in exchange one barrel of flour. The court held that this was a
bailment, locatia operisfaciendi; and that, the wheat having been
accidentally destroyed by fire, the defendants were not liable on
their agreement to deliver the flour.
Of these two cases, we may observe, that even -if
the former may
be reconciled with the authorities (as perhaps it may, upon the
theory that the several farmers, by acting upon the common usage
of making common stock of their wheat when delivered at the mill,
constituted themselves copartners in relation to the miller, while
each retained his individual character in relation to the others),
the latter stands entirely by itself, and is unsupported by any
principle whatever. An attempt to su stain the authority of the
former (on another ground than that suggested) was made in "ha8e
vs. Washburne (see Vol. 1, Am. Law Reg. 487), by BARTLEY, C. J.
Speaking of it in connection with Inglebright vs. Hammond, 19
Ohio R. 337, he says, the two cases, on examination, do not sustain 'the doctrine of Seymour vs. Brown. " On the contrary, instead of an exchange of wheat for flour, in each of the cases, by
the express terms of the contract, the flour to be returned was to
be manufactured out of the wheat furnished. In the former case
(Slaughter vs. Green) the written receipts given for the wheat, expressly provided that, it is received to be ground,' which excludes
the idea of passing the ownership to the miller. And in the latter
case (lnglebright vs. Eammond), it was also expressly provided by
the agreement, that the flour in controversy was 'to be made out
of the wheat furbished by Hammond,' and, the flour made therefrom was to be delivered at Steubenville, for said Hammond's use.'
In both these cases, therefore, the limitation in the agreement of
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the parties imported a bailment and not an exchange." But that.
learned judge seems to have forgotten that there can be no bailment
without some specific thing that can be identified and known as
being or having been the exclusive property of the bailor,-that the
possession of a bailee is only that of an agent, and that upon the
revocation of his authority before the execution of his trust, as well
as upon its execution, the bailor is entitled to the identical thing
bailed.
The facts constituting cases of bailment of this class, and the
principles properly governing them, are aptly illustrated by the
case of King vs. Humphrefys, 10 Penna. S. R. 217. There it was
shown that Humphreys, under a contract with Ensign, delivered
to him certain rags at five cents per pound, which Ensign was to
manufacture-into paper of the best quality the materials permitted,
for which he was to receive Humphreys' note at six months, at the
rate of ten cents per pound; and that this was the usual mode in
which the trade made contracts for working rags into paper. King,
a creditor of Ensign, levied on the paper. Humphreys brought
tre8pa88.

instructed the jury that "if the rags were delivered under the special contract, and the paper in controversy
was manufactured out of those identical rags, the plaintiff was entitled to recover."
In error from the District Court of Philadelphia.-Per COULTER,
J. " In this case, the instruction of the court complained of, put it
to the jury to say, whether the rags of Humphreys were delivered
to the paper-maker in sale, or exchange for paper, either by way
of payment, or as an exchange of commodities? If so, then the
creditor might attach the paper in question. But if the rags and
shavings were delivered to the artisan, in bags with the name of
Humphreys marked on.them, to be worked into 'paper for Humphreys ; that, in such event, the identical paper made from those
materials was not subject to attachment by Ensign's creditors.
This is the point of the instruction, and it.was right. The creditor
might have attached the debt, or price of manufacturing the article,
in the hands of Humphreys, but cannot attach the article itself."
SHARSWOOD, J.,
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A case previously decided, in which the facts were apparently of
a similar character, but in which a different construction of the con
tract prevailed, was that of Buffin vs. Merry, 3 Mason's R. 478.
The plaintiff agreed to let one Hutchinson take 2900 pounds of
cotton yarn at 65 cents per pound, and pay the amount in plaids
at 15 cents per yard; he was also to use the plaintiff's yarn in
making the warp of the plaids, and to use for filling other yarn of
as good a quality. The question was, whether the property in the
yarn passed to Hutchinson by its delivery to him under this contract; and it was held, by STORY, J., that it did; that the agreement imported a sale of the yarn at a specified price, to be paid for
in plaids at a specified price.
This case might possibly appear at variance with the former:
for if, by the contract, the identical cotton yarn was to be worked
up into plaids and then redelivered to the plaintiff, the fact that
other yarn was to be used in making the plaids, could not determine the transaction to be an exchange; any more than the delivery of a worn article to be repaired and returned could be
changed from a bailment to an exchange by the mere addition of
materials. It is to be remembered, however, that only such portion
of the plaids as would at 15 cents a yard amount to the price of
the yarn at 65 cents a pound, was to be returned.
A clearer case of exchange was Smith vs. Olark, 21 Wend. 83.
Smith and others made an agreement with Hubbard to deliver
wheat at his mill; and he agreed that for every four bushels and
55 pounds of wheat so delivered, he would deliver to them one
barrel of superfine flour, warranted to bear inspection in Albany or
New York. A large quantity of wheat was delivered to Hubbard
under this contract; and he delivered a part of the flour to the
plaintiffs, but not enough to satisfy his agreement, and shipped
another part for market on board a canal-boat, which part theplaintiffs by their action (replevin) caused to be arrested as their own.
The question was the same as in the preceding cases, whether
.the agreement was one of bailment or exchange; and the court held
that the transaction constituted a contract for the exchange of wheat
for flour ;-that " the property in the wheat passed from the plain-
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tiffs at the time it was delivered at the mill, and that Hubbard be.
same a debtor and was bound to .pay for the grain in flour of the
specified description and quantity. There being no agreement or
understanding that the wheat delivered by the plaintiffs should be
kept separate from other grain, or that this identical wheat should
be returned in the form of flour, Hubbard was only to deliver flour
of a particular quality, and it was wholly unimportant whether it
was manufactured from this or other grain."
The court went on
to say: ",A different doctrine was laid down in Seymour vs Brown,
.19 Johns. R. 44; but the authority of that case has often been
questioned, 2 Kent 589; Story on Bail. 193-4, 285; Buffum vs.
Merry, 3 Mason 478; and the decision was virtually overruled
in Hurd vs. West, 7 Cow. 752, and see p. 756, note. The case
of Slaughter vs. Green, 1 Rand. (Va.) R. 3,is much like Seymour
vs. Brown. They were both hard cases, and have made bad precedents."
In Baker vs. Woodruff, 2 Barbour's S. C. R. 520, (2 Comst.
s. c.in &rror, 158, by name Norton vs. Woodruff), the agreement
was in writing, as follows:" I agree to take all the wheat that Norton, Baker & Hall have
in the storehouse of S. H. Cook, in Camillus, and also all the wheat
they have at the storehouse of E. Shead, in Belle Isle, and give
them one barrel of first-rate superfine flour, at my mill in Salina,
for every four bushels and 86-60ths bushels of wheat. I am to take
the wheat at the storehouses, and pack the flour in first-rate barrels,
and warrant the flour to pass inspection in Albany or New York
market for good superfine flour. One half of the flour to be delivered on Friday of next week, and the lbalance on Friday of
week after, and as much sooner as I can make it. The wheat is
to be of good merchantable quality. Salina, Oct. 2d, '45.
J. C. WOODRUFF,
NORTON, BAKER & HALL."
Plaintiffs delivered the wheat. Defendant delivered only a
part of the flour. Subsequently defendant's mill accidentally took
fire, and was, with a part of the flour, consumed, without any fault
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in defendant. Plaintiffs brought assumpsit for the value of the
balance of the flour then remaining to be delivered by defendant
By the court, WELLES, J.--" The contract under which the
wheat in question was received by the defendant, was clearly one
of sale and not of bailment. Upon the delivery of the wheat by the
plaintiffs, it became the property of the defendant, and he thereupon
became liable to the plaintiffs to pay for it in flour, according to
the terms of the contract; and it was entirely immaterial whether
the flour should be made from the wheat of the plaintiffs or of other
wheat. The destruction of the property after it was delivered, by
the burning of the mill and contents, was the defendant's loss, and
no defence to this action. Noy's Maxims, 91, marg. p., c.93;
Bac. Abr. Bail. C.; Jones on Bail. 61. This cannot be distinguished in principle, in regard to the construction of the contract,
from that of Smith vs- Clark, 21 Wend. 83. That case, it is true,
was afterwards taken to the court for the correction of errors, and
judgment of reversal pronounced; and from that circumstance, an
impression has been entertained to a considerable extent, that the
principle decided by the late Supreme Court, in the case as reported
.in21 Wend., has been overruled in the court for the correction
of errors. But such was not the case." 2 Barb. 523. * * * *
" The case, therefore, I think should be regarded as a sound exposition of the law. The only case or dictum in the courts of this
state (N. Y.) which stands opposed to it, is the case of.Seymour vs.
BIrown, 19 Johns. 44. The latter is unsupported, so far as I have
been able to discover, excepting by the case in Virginia, of Slaughter
vs. Green, 1 Rand. 3. The current of authorities is the other way,
and so, in my opinion, is thb good sense and reason of the case:
Jones on Bail. 102, 64 ; 2 Kent 589, ed. of 1832 ; Story on Bail.
283, 438 ; Buffum vs. Merry, 3 Mason's R. 478; Hurd vs. We8t,
7 Cowen 752, 756 note; Ewing vs French, 1 Blackf. Ind. R.
353 note 2."
A case involving greater difficulty perhaps, as to the nature of
the contract, and the application of the same doctrine, was the case
of Mallory vs. Willis, 4 Const. 76-replevin for 75 barrels of
flour. The agreement was also in writing, as follows :-- Article
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of agreement niade and entered into the 19th day of August 1845,
between Mallory and Legg of the one part, and Christopher Willis
of the other part. Said Mallory and Legg agree to deliver, or
cause to be delivered, at the Hopeton Mills, during the time of
navigation, a quantity of good merchantable wheat, be the same
more or less, to be manufactured into flour, which the said Willis
agrees to do as follows: For every four bushels and fifteen pounds
of wheat, said Willis is to deliver to said Mallory and Legg, or
their order, 196 pounds of superfine flour, packed in barrels well
filled for the purpose: barrels to be furnished by said Mallory and
Legg. Said Willis to guaranty the inspection of said flour-if
scratched, to pay all losses sustained thereby. Said Mallory and
Legg to have all the offals, or feed, &c.: said Willis to store the
same until sold. And further, by said Willis performing on his
part, as above stated, said Mallory and. Legg agree to pay him sixteen cents per barrel. If said Mallory and Legg make one shilling net profit on each and every barrel of flour made at said Mills,
they are to pay said Willis two cents per barrel extra."
In pursuance of the above agreement, the pjaintilts delivered at
the Hopeton.Mills, 82,586, bushels and four.pounds of wheat, which
defendants manufactured into superfine flour; and. the evidence
tended to show that the 75 barrels of. flour in question were the
surplus left after delivering to the plaintiffs 7667 barrels and 156
pounds of flour, equal to 196 pounds for every four bushels and
fifteen pounds of wheat. The plaintiffs contended that the title
to the wheat did not pass, and the defendant insisted that'it did.
The Justice (the case being tried without a jury) found for the
l5]aintiffs, and judgment was rendered accordingly, which was
affirmed at the general term of the Supreme Court; and in the
Court of Appeals again affirmed, by six of the judges, against
two dissenting: HURLBUT, JEWETT, RUGGLES, GARDINER, PRATT,

and TAYLOR, Js., holding that the contract was one of bailment,
and BRONSON, C. J., and HARRIS, J., holding that it was one of
exchange. Only four of the judges delivered opinions: these
were HURLBUT, JEWETT, BRONSON, and HARRIS; and while all of
them appear to have relied upon the same authorities, it cannot
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but be admitted that if the arguments of the dissenting judges do
not effectually sift the wheat from the chaff of this case, they at
least show themselves entitled to the attentive consideration of
every candid mind. Not wholly impossible it might seem to be,
that the judges who regarded the contract in the light of a bailment, were misled by the false analogy of the common case
(among farmers) of carrying grist to mill, put by Justice JEWETT
to show an implied bailment; and as to the force of which, he
possibly fell into an error; for, in the case put, the bailment is not
clearly implied from the mere transaction itself, but rather from
the well-known usage of the country miller as to receiving and
grinding grist, taking toll, and then redelivering the grain in the
shape of flour. It will, however, be remembered that the wheat
was delivered to,he ground into flour, and that the designation of
the purpose of the delivery, and this by the express agreement of
the parties, cannot well be overlooked in the construction of any
contract. Indeed, in nearly all the cases of this sort which have
been held to be cases of bailment, this or a similar stipulation has
been regarded as the most important index to the real intention
of the contracting parties.
Another case concerning the same subject-matter, and in which
the same legal principles were applied, though with a different result, was Foster vs. Pettibone, 3 Selden 433. The agreement was
in the following form: "John G. Brown agrees to deliver to William 0. Foster, at Rochester, thirty thousand bshels of wheat to
be ground, fifteen thousand bushels to be ground in season to be
shipped east during navigation this fall, and fifteen thousand to be
ground during the winter; said Brown is to be subject to no charge
on account of storage; said Foster is to deliver to said Brown one
barrel of superfine flour for each five bushels of wheat so delivered
to be ground. The wheat to be received from Gelston & Evans,
and the flour to be delivered to them." In this case, the court
held the contract to be clearly one of bailment, but reaffirmed the
doctrine laid down by BRONSON, C. J., in the preceding case,
that "when the identical thing delivered, although in an altered
form, is to be restored, the contract is one of bailment, and the
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title to the property is not changed; but when there is no obliga.
tion to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to
return another thing of equal value, he becomes a debtor to make
the return, and the title to the property is, changed, it is a sale."
It was here observed that "the judges in that case differed with
respect to the effect of the distinction upon the case before them,
but not in regard to the distinction itself."
This doctrine, deducible from nearly all the reported cases,
(see Chase vs. Washburne, reported at length in the flst volume
of this work, p. 487, et 8eq., and Baker vs. Boberts, 8 Greenl.
.01), will not be found at variance with any sound authority.
(It is well enough to note a peculiar characteristic of the last-ment.. ned case. The risk of the property was expressly taken by the
party receiving it; notwithstanding, he was held to be a bailee.
The case was briefly 'this :-A. agreed to take the logs of B. at a
certain place, and at an agreed method of computing the quantity,
to saw them into boards, and transport and deliver the boards to
B. ; ana the latter agreed to sell the boards, free of charge for
commissions, and to allow A. all they should sell for beyond a
certain price; the property to be and remain all this time at the
risk of A. It was held that this was not a sale of the logs to A.,
but was merely a locatio opers faciendi. In general, as we have
seen, the risk of the property in this class of cases is exclusively
with the bailer, and whenever it is otherwise, it is because the
bailee is guilty of some wrong, or has assumed the obligation of
un insurer.)
* The rule in such cases, as settled by the authorities, may therefore be stated to be, that where one delivers to another any speeirm
thing under an agreement that the identicalthing shall be restored,
changed onb" in form, there is a bailment, and the right ofyroperty
remains the same; but where it is understood that the receiver is
not obliged to return the identical thing itsel, but only some other,
of the kind and value, or of a specific nature, quantity and quality,
there is no bailment, but an exchange, and the title to the property
i8 transferred.
But it is not very difficult to conceive of a case to which this rule
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would not apply. Suppose the evidence proves a bailment, a
delivery of a specific thing merely for labor thereon, and proves at
the same time a circumstance to have occurred, in the regular
process of executing the work contracted for, that must, from its
very nature and character, have excluded all possibility of knowing what thing in particular was produced from the identical
material delivered. Is this case to be construed as one of bailment? A bailment is legally possible (as a relation by which the
relative duties and rights of parties may be determined) only so
long as there is some certain thing that can be identified as being
or having been the property of the bailor. Moreover, the bailor's
right of property is limited to the identical thing delivered ; and
when the bailee is in no default, the bailor must have either the
identical thing or nothing at all. Take, then, the case just
stated, or a case in which, without any default of the bailee, perhaps with the consent of the bailor (as in Slaughter vs. Green),
the thing becomes mixed with some other of the same nature
(wheat with other wheat, for instance), so, that it cannot thence be
distinguished or identified. The consequence must be the same in
either case, that the bailor's property is lost, and nothing at all
can be demanded of the bailee. Again, in either case, if the contract be construed as one of bailment, the bailor may, at any time
before the work is completed, revoke the bailee's authority, and,
upon tender of payment for the work, demand the specific thing
bailed. But it cannot be identified; the thing to which he has a
right is as though it did not exist; it cannot be delivered to him;
in short, he has an impossible right! Suppose that the bailee is
robbed without any default of his own, or that the property has
been destroyed by unavoidable accident, (as was also the case-in
Slaughter vs. Green;) in answer to the bailor's 'demand, he has
only to show that he was robbed of the bailor's property, or that
it was unavoidably destroyed. And yet he cannot show to what
particular thing that property referred; he cannot trace the connection between the robbery or destruction, and the property of
the bailor ; but he has a right, if a bailee, to plead the fact as a
defence; another impossible right !

